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THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS,
PART TWO
JAMES E. KRIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium is about the idea of "free market environ-
mentalism" in general and the book Free Market Environmental-
ism, by Terry Anderson and Donald Leal,1 in particular. While I
focus chiefly on Anderson and Leal's book, the discussion will
necessarily involve the general idea of free market environ-
mentalism as well.
The conceit of my tide, which obviously derives from Garrett
Hardin's celebrated essay on The Tragedy of the Commons,2 is this:
Superficial differences aside, Hardin's essay and Anderson and
Leal's book address the same fundamental problem of coordi-
nating human behavior as it affects environmental quality. But
both the essay and the book attack their shared concern with
the same troubling kind of argument. Aiming to resolve the
problem of coordination, the authors proceed instead to as-
sume it away. As we shall see, this flaw is perhaps more appar-
ent, and excusable, in Hardin's essay than it is in Anderson and
Leal's book, but it can be found in the book nonetheless-as
can a few other difficulties.
II. SOME BACKGROUND
The idea of relying more fully on market-based incentives to
control environmental problems is by now almost old hat. The
intellectual history dates back at least to the 1930s, when the
British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou is thought to have sug-
gested the imposition of taxes on pollution emissions. 3 In
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor of Law, University of Michigan. An earlier version
of this essay was presented at a conference on Free Market Environmentalism, North-
western School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, April 13, 1991.
1. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).
Readers especially interested in free market environmentalism might also wish to read
an essay by Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, The Free Market and the Environment,
PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1989, at 30. Stroup and Shaw's account is much shorter than
Anderson and Leal's, but similar in tone.
2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
3. See James E. Krier, Marketlike Approaches: Their Past, Present, and Probable Future, in
REFORMING SOCIAL REGULATION: ALTERNATIVE PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES 151, 152 (Le-
Roy Graymer & Frederick Thompson eds., 1982). I say that Pigou is thought to have
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1968, the Canadian economist J. H. Dales popularized the re-
lated technique of transferable pollution rights, which would
also internalize the costs of pollution to sources.4 Either alter-
native promises a number of advantages when compared to
traditional command-and-control regulation, including more
efficient patterns of pollution reduction and heightened incen-
tives for technological advances, which together yield lower ag-
gregate control costs for any given level of environmental
improvement. 5
In terms of actual policy, transferable or marketable pollu-
tion rights have proved to be the alternative of choice in the
United States. Such rights were created first, though modestly,
in the Emissions Trading Program devised by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency as it implemented the Clean Air Act.6
Now they appear most notably in the acid rain provisions of the
1990 amendments to the Act, which set up a system of trade-
able permits in sulfur dioxide.7
suggested pollution taxes because, while the idea is regularly attributed to him, his
major treatise implies that he actually proposed to subsidize pollution control (he would
have taxed as nuisances activities like raising too many rabbits). See id.; A.C. PIGOU, TIlE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1962).
The misattribution provides a lesson in the social construction of social problems. It
has been fairly standard from Pigou on to think of subsidies (Pigou called them "boun-
ties") for producing external benefits, whereas taxes or charges are deemed most ap-
propriate in the case of external costs. In Pigou's day, clean air was probably viewed as
something of a luxury, with dirty air being the norm. If so, pollution control would
similarly be seen as conferring an external benefit or good (Pigou called it an "inciden-
tal service") deserving of a subsidy, whereas something like excess rabbits, deemed an
external cost or bad ("incidental disservice"),justified a tax. Today, the relevant norms
are largely reversed-we regard the absence of pollution control as bad, the nurturing
of wildlife as good-and so we are inclined to reverse the incentives as well, tending to
charge where Pigou would have rewarded, to reward where he would have charged.
4. J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, POLICY, AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND
ECONOMICS (1968).
5. See, e.g, Krier, supra note 3, at 152-53. Given that my comments on Anderson and
Leal's vision of "free market environmentalism" will prove to be largely critical, I
should mention that I have no global objections to incentive-based environmental con-
trois. To the contrary, I support them, just as I did when I began working in the envi-
ronmental field two decades ago. See, e.g.,James E. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal
Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 UCLA L. REV. 429, 470-75 (1971).
6. See generally RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE
TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUBBLE (1986); RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFF-
SETS: TRADING, SELLING AND BANKING (1980).
7. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399,
2584-2631 (1990). Transferable rights have been the dominant market-based approach
to environmental policy in the United States, but not the only one, as the commonplace
of "bottle bills" shows. On the situation in the United States, see Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991). Other countries have adopted a variety of related eco-
nomic-incentive measures. A fairly encompassing survey can be found in ECONOMIC
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31-109 (O.E.C.D. 1989).
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The transferable rights technique is also the alternative of
choice for Anderson and Leal, which is not to say that they
wholeheartedly endorse current policy trends. They complain,
for example, that the Clean Air Act's tradeable permits
do not represent a truly free-market approach to reducing
acid rain. A government agency still must determine the
level [total number] of permits, and the permits do not force
polluters to compensate those harmed by the pollution. In
this system, the political process determines the initial or op-
timal pollution levels, not the polluters bargaining with
those who bear the costs of the pollution.8
It is easy enough to see that Anderson and Leal envision a
much more radical (some would say reactionary) reliance on
the market to control environmental problems. Rather than us-
ing market-based techniques and incentives selectively, as occa-
sional and constrained instruments in decidedly governmental
programs, they hope to rely on the market more or less entirely
and side-step the government just about altogether.
Anderson and Leal's core proposal, drawn from a familiar
body of economic theory, 9 is to set up an expansive "system of
well-specified property rights to natural resources." 10 The idea
is that whoever holds these rights, whether individuals, busi-
ness entities, or nonprofit groups, will feel the discipline of ex-
clusive ownership, because mismanagement or pollution of the
underlying resources would result in the fouling of one's own
nest. Even if rights-holders would otherwise be indifferent to
polluting their resources, they will be drawn to consider the
interests of others because of the transferability of the rights.
As neglect would reduce the market price of rights, owners will
feel incentives to be prudent. Of course, they also will feel in-
centives to shift the costs of mismanagement. Rather than pol-
luting their own land or water, for instance, they would prefer
to send the pollution onto the property of someone else. To
deal with this externality problem, Anderson and Leal suggest,
but make no effort to delineate, a system of strict liability ad-
ministered by the courts."
8. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 158.
9. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(Papers & Proc. 1967).
10. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 3.
11. See id. The system is ill-defined in several respects. Most notably, Anderson and
Leal duck the issue of how one decides, in the case of incompatible uses, who has the
right to do what to whom. They appear to believe that there is some background natu-
No. 2] 327
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The free market proposal would be relatively unremark-
able-in fact, would be almost conventional by now-were it
limited to the notion that we should seek to improve our pres-
ent property rights systems in land and water resources, or that
we should try to rely more extensively on market-based tech-
niques in environmental regulation. Anderson and Leal, how-
ever, have much more than this in mind. They advocate
sweeping reforms that would substitute their free market alter-
native for many of the state and federal legislative programs
now used to control environmental problems. In a series of vi-
gnettes sketched over nine chapters,' 2 they consider with en-
thusiastic optimism the capacity of free markets to regulate the
quantity and quality of virtually all natural resources-not just
the obvious candidates such as surface water, groundwater,
timberland, and grazing land, but also wildlife and recreation
areas, the oceans, and the air (including the upper reaches of
the atmosphere, which are subject to global warming). Where
at present we tend to have government regulations, with free
market environmentalism we would have property rights.
In some cases, of course, implementation of such an ambi-
tious rights system would have to await technological advances,
like the development of "tracers" to identify the nature,
amounts, and sources of air, land, and water pollutants. With-
out such tracers, it would often be impossible, as a practical
matter, to monitor and enforce the new rights.13 Anderson and
Leal argue, not unpersuasively, that this problem would tend to
take care of itself. The value created by the rights system would
give entrepreneurs powerful incentives to invent whatever is
needed to facilitate and protect security of ownership.
The regime envisioned by Anderson and Leal would not be
utterly devoid of governmental influence and activity. Initially,
ral order that settles the issue, but there is not. Suppose a polluter P is located next
door to a farmer F. If P's pollution kills Fs crops, is P strictly liable to F? At times
Anderson and Leal imply that the answer is yes, and at other times no. For example, at
one point they suggest that sulfur dioxide emitters should "be forced to pay for the
damages they cause." Id. at 166. But at another point they seem to say that if air pollu-
tion causes global warming, which in turn alters rainfall patterns to the injury of farm-
ers, then that is the farmers' problem. Id. at 163.
The general question-which has to do with much more than just problems of strict
liability-concerns the matter of how resource rights are to be distributed in the first
instance. The question is crucial to Anderson and Leal's case, but they ignore it
entirely.
12. Id. at 24-174.
13. Id. at 165-67.
328 [Vol. 15
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the government would play a crucial role in setting up and
maintaining the new markets. It would have to abandon ex-
isting regulatory requirements and participate in the process of
defining and distributing the resource rights. Courts would
have to run the strict liability regime, and some government
agency would probably have to administer a title recording sys-
tem, 14 but there would be much less direct government regula-
tion than there is now, which is just what Anderson and Leal
want.
Disenchantment with the existing regulatory system is hardly
confined to free market enthusiasts. Barry Commoner, for ex-
ample, is as ideologically distant from Anderson and Leal as
anyone could be, yet he agrees with much of their assessment.
Like them, he finds the government's environmental record to
date unenviable and the present regulatory approach virtually
designed to fail. Indeed, like Anderson and Leal, he wants con-
trol of environmental problems to be essentially handed back
to the people. The parties part ways, however, when it comes to
the question of how. For Commoner, the answer is socialism,
or something like it. Observing an environmental politics dom-
inated by self-interested groups, especially powerful corpora-
tions that manipulate the system to their own ends, Commoner
urges a program of "social governance" that would, somehow,
put the people at large in command. 5 Anderson and Leal, on
the other hand, mean to accomplish the same objective by just
the opposite approach. They would counter the undesirable
consequences of self-interest not by making the responsibility
for environmental management more collective, but less.
Where Commoner wants a truly public regime, Anderson and
Leal want a truly private one.
Their reasons, ably presented (though not particularly fresh),
run as follows: 16 Given human nature, it is wiser to harness
self-interest than to preach against it. Social institutions should
14. See id. at 3 (stressing the "important role for government in the enforcement of
property rights"). The government would help establish "clearly specified titles-ob-
tained from land recording systems, strict liability rules, and adjudication of disputed
property rights in courts .... " Id.
15. See Barry Commoner, A Reporter at Large, The Environment, NEw YORKER, June 15,
1987, at 46, 62;James E. Krier, The Political Economy of Barry Commoner, 20 ENVrTL. L. 11,
27 (1990) (detailing Commoner's socialist vision). Commoner did not explain how or
why "social governance" would work.
16. My summary is drawn primarily from Anderson and Leal's first two chapters, but
the same themes run throughout their book.
No. 2] 329
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provide constructive incentives, and this is precisely what pri-
vate property and markets do. Markets discipline human im-
pulses and capitalize on diffuse information. The
decentralization of private property enables an appropriate re-
sponsiveness to discrete circumstances, including the complex-
ity typically found in the natural environment.
Government regulation is said to suffer in comparison.17 Ef-
fective regulation depends on concentrating within an agency
all relevant information, but that task overwhelms managerial
capacities. Relative to markets, government agencies are invari-
ably centralized, and thus less sensitive to diverse conditions.
Furthermore, because the government actors own nothing of
what they control, they escape many of the consequences of
wasteful mismanagement. Politics provides some discipline,
but only imperfectly. Government actors are as self-interested
as anyone else. They hope to advance their careers, build their
budgets, and protect their turf, responding to the tug and pull
of outside voices with such objectives at least partly in mind.
The wishes of the electorate may at times constrain their behav-
ior, but more often the demands of lobbying groups will play a
greater role. Government agents will be inclined to send the
costs of mismanagement in the direction of poorly organized
interests, even though the latter might represent the majority
will.
From the standpoint of environmental quality, government
mismanagement, induced by the distorted incentives of regula-
tors, can cut in either of two directions-too much quality, or
too little, relative to the social optimum or the majority will.
Anderson and Leal cite regulation of the Arctic National Wild-
life Refuge as an example of "too much" quality. If oil produc-
tion is not allowed in the area, consumers will pay higher prices
for petroleum products. The cost in the aggregate could be
very large, but it would be small per capita, leading each con-
sumer to ignore the underlying issues and affording a dispro-
portionate influence to environmental interest groups:
[O]rganized groups that favor preserving wildlife habitat in
the pristine tundra can gain by stopping drilling in the ref-
uge. To the extent that those who benefit from wildlife pres-
ervation do not have to pay the opportunity costs of forgone
energy production, they will demand "too much" wildlife
17. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 1-23.
[Vol. 15
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habitat. 18
Regarding ways in which the regulatory process may readily
yield "too little" environmental quality, Anderson and Leal say,
for example:
[S]pecial interests that engage in waste disposal are just as
likely-or perhaps even more likely, if they are well organ-
ized-to influence the agency as are those who suffer dam-
ages. The capture of regulatory policies by polluters is not
surprising when we realize that the costs of control are con-
centrated on thepolluter but the benefits are diffused across
the population. 9
At least in the context of environmental problems, the sec-
ond illustration is more apt than the first, because groups inter-
ested in disrupting the environment generally have a
comparative organizational or lobbying advantage over groups
interested in preserving it. On average and over time, we
should expect to observe that government regulation does too
little for the environment, rather than too much.2 °
This is what Barry Commoner observes-a regulatory system
that yields insufficient improvements in environmental qual-
ity-and so he indicts the government for its failure.2 1 Ander-
son and Leal agree with the general charge of failure, though
they probably believe that most commonly misregulation re-
sults in excessive improvements. In any event, they would flatly
reject Commoner's remedy of collective social governance. In
their view, after all, the underlying problem is an absence of
individual accountability. Socialization would only make mat-
ters worse, and in more ways than one. Free market environ-
18. lId at 15. The example is an odd one, because in the case of the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge it probably does not much matter that petroleum consumers are
poorly organized as compared to groups favoring habitat preservation. There is, after
all, a very well organized interest group that we could expect to represent consumers-
the petroleum industry. The point is neatly proved by coincidence:Just as I was writing
the final draft of this essay in June 1991, I received a bulk mailing from the Natural
Resources Defense Council addressing the very issue of the Arctic Refuge. In the mail-
ing was an undated letter from the actor Robert Redford, a member of the NRDC
Board. It said in part that "the oil companies have now mounted a massive campaign in
Congress to open up the Arctic Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to drilling."
19. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 139-40.
20. It is difficult to tell whether the facts are consistent with this generalization. Since
1970 there has been a raft of environmental legislation, suggesting that the govern-
ment does much on behalf of the environment. But one also has to look at how stan-
dards are actually implemented, at rates of enforcement, and so on. Moreover, one has
to look at matters over the long haul, and twenty years is probably too short a period to
form the basis for a sound judgment.
21. See generally Commoner, supra note 15.
No. 2]
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mentalism is about more than effective policy. "Even if
regulatory solutions can improve environmental quality," An-
derson and Leal argue, "these benefits must be traded off
against.., the costs to individual freedom and liberty."' 22 Reg-
ulation can be
a guise for political control reminiscent of the governments
being rejected in Eastern Europe. Not only has that form of
political control despoiled the environment and deprived
people of higher living standards, it has oppressed
individuals. 23
The market, because it is thought to escape both these short-
comings, "offers the only possibility for improving environ-
mental quality, raising living standards, and, perhaps most
important, expanding individual liberty."'24
III. QUESTION-BEGGING
A few remarks like these aside, the conservative political pro-
gram underlying Free Market Environmentalism is only implicitly
argued. The explicit discussion is about economics and in the
context of economics, "free" takes on an altogether different
meaning. Nothing is free, whether a lunch or a market, so free
market environmentalism is, if not a moronic idea, at least an
oxymoron. Anderson and Leal concede as much.21 "This kind
of approach is not costless .... Property rights are costly to
define and enforce ....
A.
Private property depends on a means to set up and run the
system, and ultimately that means is the government. Some
agency has to figure out the contours of the rights and then
distribute the rights by one or another set of criteria. Once the
rights are defined and distributed, they must be protected, by
22. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 171.
23. Id
24. Id at 172.
25. They do insist from the outset that the notion of free market environmentalism
is not an "oxymoron," id. at 1, but their view is different from mine. They are not
claiming that markets are free, but only that it is not contradictory to say that markets
can regulate environmental quality (though at some cost). As to free lunches, they
seem to believe in them! See id. at 75 (suggesting that the public trust doctrine "might
provide a free lunch to special interests").
26. See id. at 124, 167; see also id. at 22 ("costs of establishing property rights are
positive").
332 [Vol. 15
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the courts or otherwise, against boundary crossings, involun-
tary transfers, externalities, or whatever one wishes to call inva-
sions of property rights. Even at its simplest, then, a private
market founded on private property is elaborate, public, and
expensive. 2
7
Compare this to a system of common property, where the only
relevant institution is, in essence, the community at large. What
common property means is that any member of the community
has a right to take out of the community's common pool of re-
sources whatever the member wishes. If other members object,
their only remedy (other than ostracism) is to go and do like-
wise; in contrast to private property, no one has the right to
exclude fellow members from tapping the common resources.
So under a common property regime, all the costs of setting up
and maintaining a system of private ownership are avoided.
Common ownership also helps to avoid transaction costs. In
the case of a private property system, it is extraordinarily un-
likely that rights would be distributed initially in a way that
maximized their aggregate value. Even if, by some miracle, the
initial distribution happened to be perfect in this respect, it
would hardly remain so over time, because populations grow
and change, tastes alter, technology advances, and so forth. In-
evitably, at some point an owner A would hold rights valued
more by B, and vice versa. In order to realign the private prop-
erty holdings so as to increase aggregate welfare, A and B
would have to enter into a transaction, and transactions always
carry positive costs in time and energy expended. But with
common ownership, A and B could just go help themselves
from the common pool. Transactions would not be needed.
Compared to a system of private property, then, common
ownership has at least one considerable virtue-it is cheaper.
Unhappily, however, the very feature that accounts for this, the
nonsequestration of ownership, leads eventually to the vice of
waste, of too little conservation, of too much pollution. That is
the message of Hardin's famous essay on The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, to which I referred earlier.2 8
27. SeeJESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 46 n.18 (2d ed. 1988).
28. See Hardin, supra note 2.
No. 2] 333
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B.
Hardin's argument, like Anderson and Leal's, rests on the
assumption of human self-interest and runs as follows. If popu-
lation and demand grow with time, as has been the case histori-
cally, then there must come a day when depletion threatens the
stock of commonly owned resources. Overconsumption be-
comes a pressing problem because the absence of individual
ownership, or private property, dampens incentives to con-
serve. "As a rational being," Hardin wrote, each member of the
community "seeks to maximize his gain."29 Each is inclined to
act, that is, in a self-interested way, taking yet another unit of
good (say oil or water) out of the common pool, or putting yet
another unit of bad (such as pollution) into the pool, despite
the obvious and increasing scarcity, and perhaps because of it.
After all, how can one afford to desist when to do so only ex-
pands the opportunities of others to take? And if others can
only be expected to take, should not one take first? The result-
ing depletion is costly, but the costs are spread across all mem-
bers of the community. The benefits of exploitation, in
contrast, accrue to the individual. The logic is remorseless;
hence its "tragic" element. Individual self-interest leads inexo-
rably to destruction of the community of individuals. "Freedom
in a commons brings ruin to all."3 0
The problem of the commons, Hardin said, has no "technical
solution," by which he meant that the problem cannot be
solved by "a change only in the techniques of the natural sci-
ences." 31 Rather, there must be a "change in human values or
ideas of morality." 2 In particular, the community must will-
ingly surrender the unfettered freedom that characterizes com-
mon ownership and substitute for it "mutual coercion,
mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected." 33
Mutual coercion can be realized through any number of
measures, all of them familiar: a system of private property
rights; a system of public ownership, with the government con-
trolling use-rights and allocating them by merit, on the basis of
first-come first-served, or through auctions; a system of taxa-
29. Id- at 1244.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1243.
32. Id
33. Id. at 1247.
[Vol. 15
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tion or other "coercive laws," such as regulations, "that make it
cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to dis-
charge them untreated."3' 4 Hardin recognized that none of
these can work perfectly, if for no other reason than that the
"statutory law" and "administrative law" set up to implement
them will be overseen by government agents who are them-
selves "singularly liable to corruption."3 But that is an ines-
capable problem; the best we can do is work "to invent the
corrective feedbacks that are needed to keep custodians
honest." 6
While The Tragedy of the Commons is deservedly celebrated, its
central insight was actually prefigured by the economist Harold
Demsetz. Demsetz, moreover, penetrated more deeply. In an
article published a year before Hardin's essay,37 he showed that
the problem of the commons is at bottom a problem of coordi-
nation. Common ownership, coupled with self-interest, leads
each member of the community to exploit each other member
by exploiting the common resources. As we have seen, the
community would at some point be better off in the aggregate
if its members could agree to reduce their rates of consumption,
but coordination through such an agreement is extraordinarily
difficult because of the high transaction costs occasioned by the
absence of sequestered ownership, or private property. With
common property, as Demsetz explained, members of the com-
munity would have to engage in constantly ongoing, terribly
drawn-out negotiations with each other about how to treat the
commons, item by item and case by case, for each member is
free to exploit in the absence of agreements to the contrary.
Consider an example. Suppose a commonly owned forest
and a community member A who is about to harvest a tree. Im-
agine that B wants the tree to be saved and is willing to pay A
not to chop. A can effectively promise B that she, A, will desist,
but cannot guarantee anything regarding the activities of other
members of the community. B thus has to negotiate with them
as well. B and others who favor conservation have to figure out
the total stock of trees they wish to save and then pay all poten-
tial choppers for their promises not to chop whatever number
34. Id. at 1245.
35. Id. at 1245-46
36. Id.
37. See Demsetz, supra note 9.
No. 2] 335
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of trees that happens to represent. The price is likely to be
high, both because many people and many trees will be in-
volved, and because each potential chopper-entitled to chop
all that he or she has not promised not to chop-can be ex-
pected to hold out for large payments. (Each chopper is effec-
tively a monopolist whose agreement is essential to saving any
trees.) But how is the consideration for these side-payments to
be raised? People of a conservationist bent, seeing that a tree
saved is a tree saved whether or not they help pay for it, will be
inclined to take a free ride, hoping others will pay for the col-
lective benefits of conservation.
It is a bit of a mess, and one that neatly explains why re-
sources subject to common ownership are exploited. One theo-
retical solution to the problem of exploitation is ostracism of
unenlightened community members by enlightened ones, but
ostracism itself takes time and energy (and makes one feel like a
nag) and, to the extent that it succeeds, once again results in
the collective benefits of trees saved-so the free-rider problem
remains. There is likely to be an undersupply of nagging.
Ostracism is problematic in other ways, too, as Hardin
demonstrated. He argued that, in the short run, appeals to con-
science have pathogenic effects: The people who are ostracized
end up feeling either guilty, if they resist, or like suckers if they
do not. They are caught in a neurotic double bind. In the long
run, appeals to conscience breed the conscientious out of exist-
ence."8 This is why Hardin would resort instead to his program
of "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon." He would have
the community agree, once and for all, on a new regime to reg-
ulate the commons.
The difficulty is that if the community is fairly large, then the
costs of reaching agreement on Hardin's new order are once
again going to be prohibitively high. It typically takes a large
number of people a long time to agree on anything, and time is
a cost. Moreover, in the particular case of negotiating about
modifications in a system of common ownership, agreement
will be especially costly because each member of the commu-
nity has incentives, once again, to behave strategically in the
course of discussion. Each can be expected to free-ride on the
efforts of others to achieve the collective benefits of the new
38. See Hardin, supra note 2, at 1246-47.
336 [Vol. 15
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regime, and to hold out for private benefits as the price of
agreement. It is again a mess.
I stated at the outset that there is an excusable flaw in Har-
din's argument, and one can now see what it is. As Demsetz
demonstrated, the tragic fate of common ownership arises
from the underlying problem of an absence of coordination.
Hardin simply assumes that problem away. Confronted by a
community, the structure of which makes coordination seem-
ingly impossible, he admonishes it . . . to coordinate! Faced
with people who cannot agree, he urges agreement: "mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon." But if the members could
agree on a program of mutual coercion, then probably they
would not have to; they could equally restrain themselves by
other means. If they cannot so restrain themselves, then how
do they agree on a program of mutual coercion? There is a
seemingly inescapable contradiction in the argument.39
None of this is to say that Hardin is undeserving of the celeb-
rity he enjoys in ecological circles. His story about the com-
mons is elegant, and his insights into the role of private
property, regulation, taxation, and markets in rights are correct
and widely shared by economists. What he called in dosing
"the simplest summary" of his analysis-that "the commons, if
justifiable at all, is justifiable only under conditions of low-pop-
ulation density"-is fundamentally correct, perhaps more so
than Hardin understood.40
In any event, the contradiction in Hardin's argument is ex-
cusable for any number of reasons. First of all, in framing The
Tragedy of the Commons Hardin had a particular political purpose
39. An apparent way to avoid the contradiction is to regard it as conceivable that the
members of a community could muster the will and effort to get together just once, at
time T, to set up a system that would thereafter coerce them to act in appropriate ways
and for the collective benefit of all. But the path leads to the same contradiction. Once
the coercive system is set up, it will be susceptible to breakdown, corruption, and so on;
hence it will need ongoing maintenance, and community members are going to have to
keep cooperating in order to provide that maintenance. Cooperation will entail the
same struggle all over again, because the benefits of maintenance are necessarily col-
lective. And it is no answer to appoint someone, at time T, to be in charge of the job,
because that someone too will have to be monitored subsequently. Et cetera.
40. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1248. Hardin no doubt meant that a commons might be
justified under conditions of low-population density because, with a small population,
the unsynchronized demands on common resources are not so worrisome, since supply
is likely to be large relative to demand. What Hardin failed to consider was the fact
that, with a small population, the costs of synchronizing demand are small as well.
Small groups can coordinate more easily than large ones. Ostracism is probably cheap-
est and most effective in small groups, and so too for transactions.
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in mind. World population growth was a salient issue at the
time, and Hardin was trying to silence those people who ar-
gued that a voluntary program of birth control is the only moral
approach to curtailing reproduction. His message was that
population growth is itself a problem of the commons not to be
solved by anything short of coercion. 4' Second, Hardin went
forth on the commonplace assumption that if he managed to
convince his audience of the need for coercive restraints, the
government would just "be there" to do the job, to act in the
public interest once the public interest was known.42 Though
he acknowledged that government agents are corruptible, his
argument implicitly assumed that the government could be
counted on to act in good faith and on its own to coerce the
public. 43
What Hardin neglected is a point taken from modern polit-
ical theory: The public has to coerce the government to coerce
it, and to do this the public must organize. Yet an inability to
organize, or coordinate, is the problem to begin with. If a pro-
gram of population controls, once realized, would benefit the
world at large, whether or not any particular person or group
helped talk the government into enacting it, then the problem
of free riders still persists. Moreover, what if interest groups
ardently opposed to a population control program have less
trouble organizing than people who favor it, because on aver-
age they hold their views with the greater zeal?
The contradiction in The Tragedy of the Commons is finally ex-
cusable because Hardin is a biologist, not an economist or a
political theorist, and thus could not be expected to know
about the rather fancy and remote transaction-cost account
published by Demsetz a year earlier. Even if Hardin had discov-
ered Demsetz he would only have been misled, because the
same mistake appears in Toward a Theory of Property Rights; Dem-
setz ends up begging the same question, assuming the same
problem away, implicitly arguing that a community plagued by
noncooperation can improve its condition by cooperating.44
Indeed, the error seems to be rife in the literature on common
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1245-46.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 35 and 36.
44. In particular, Demsetz reasoned that private property (which promotes efficient
resource allocation) develops when the waste induced by common ownership becomes
intolerable. The difficulty is that a private property regime can only be achieved
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C.
The error is also rife in Anderson and Leal's book, though
they should have known better. Anderson, after all, is a produc-
tive professional economist and a close student of property
rights theory.46 By the time he and Leal wrote their book on
free market environmentalism, the question-begging problem
had been identified in the literature, and we can expect them to
have known about it.47 They ought to have seen the problem in
any event, because they have a complete grasp of all the rele-
vant underlying concepts and how they play out.
In the first two chapters of Free Market Environmentalism,48 An-
derson and Leal provide an excellent primer on how to think
about market versus government in the context of environmen-
tal policy. Their brief yet cogent and easily accessible discus-
sion explains, or lays the groundwork for later explaining,49 the
through cooperation, yet the absence of cooperation is the very problem that Demsetz
thought private property developed to solve.
The contradiction inherent in Demsetz's argument has been long and widely recog-
nized in the literature. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in
Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281, 289 (1979) (noting the illogical leap in Demsetz's argu-
ment); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHics, EcoNoM-
ICS, AND THE LAW 3, 30 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)
(recognizing the need for cooperation to establish private property); DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 27, at 46; Carol Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HuM. 37, 50-51 (1990) (arguing
that a private property regime has the same structure as common property). When
some years ago I pointed out to Professor Demsetz the contradiction in his article, he
replied, "That's why I called it 'Toward a Theory of Property Rights'!"
At bottom, a theory of private property depends on a theory of the state. One cannot
suppose that the state sets up the private property system without explaining the exist-
ence of the state itself, because the state too can only come into existence through
cooperation. See, e.g., Rose, supra, at 51-52 (noting that classical theorists like Locke and
Blackstone argued that people established "civil society" to escape the insecurity of the
state of nature, a commons, but their argument "slides over" the crucial question: "Just
how did they form that civil society and its government, anyway?"). Professor Ander-
son noted the connection between theories of property and theories of the state some
years ago, but seems to have lost sight of it since. See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 12 J.L. & EcoN. 163, 167 n.15
(1975).
45. See generally Rose, supra note 44.
46. Anderson is professor of economics at Montana State University, a senior associ-
ate with the Political Economy Research Center, and senior economist for the Pacific
Research Institute for Public Policy, the publisher of Free Market Environmentalism. The
bibliography at the end of the book lists a number of his articles and books on resource
economics and property rights theory. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 175-76.
47. See, e.g., supra note 44.
48. ANDERSON & LEL, supra note 1, at 1-23.
49. Common property, for example, is not explicitly discussed until Chapter 9, on
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basic issues: the need for constructive incentives; the character-
istics and advantages of private property and markets; the costs
necessarily occasioned in establishing and operating markets;
the causes of market failure, such as externalities, transaction
costs, free riders, holdouts, and public goods;"° the essential
role of government in a market system; government regulation
as an alternative to the market; the costs of government opera-
tions; the reasons for failure of government regulation; and the
influence of self-interested groups on self-interested govern-
ment agents.
Beyond all of this, Anderson and Leal explicitly acknowledge
that the issue of coordination is of central importance:
[T]here is a more realistic way of thinking about natural re-
sources and environmental policy. This alternative recog-
nizes and emphasizes the costs of coordinating human
actions. There is no assumption that costs of engaging in a
transaction are zero or that there is perfect competition. To
the contrary, understanding alternative policies requires that
we specify coordination costs and discover why and where
competitive forces may not be working.5 1
Anderson and Leal frame these remarks in this way to stress the
special importance of comparative institutional analysis. Mar-
kets are not perfect, they say, but then neither are govern-
ments. In particular, problems of coordination hamper both.
The objective is to determine what mixes of market and gov-
ernment, rights and regulation, work best under various cir-
cumstances, and why. Anderson and Leal relate at some length
how environmentalist Randal O'Toole learned this essential
lesson. O'Toole once regarded markets as bad and the govern-
ment as a cure-all, until he went to work for the U.S. Forest
"Homesteading the Oceans." Hardin's essay on The Tragedy of the Commons does not
figure as such in the discussion; I cannot find it cited in any of Anderson and Leal's
footnotes, though it is listed in their bibliography. Id. at 179. Of course, they have a full
understanding of Hardin's argument. They examine the problems of common property
in the context of ocean fisheries, national parks, public grazing lands, and pollution.
These are the same examples mentioned by Hardin, supra note 2, at 1245.
50. For present purposes, public goods (or collective goods) are goods which, once
produced, cannot be easily withheld from any person, whether or not that person con-
tributed to the goods' production (lighthouses are thought to be a classic example).
Hence, public goods are plagued by free-rider problems, giving rise to the concern that
the market cannot provide them. Anderson and Leal cite instances suggesting that
these concerns are not always justified; unhappily, though, they provide no insight into
how and why markets managed to function in those particular cases. See, e.g., ANDERSON
& LEAL, supra note 1, at 70, 95, 108.
51. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 10.
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Service and learned that its decisions were "based mainly on
their effects on forest budgets." 52 This led to an epiphany for
O'Toole, who
gradually developed a new view of the world that recognized
the flaws of government as well as the flaws in markets. Re-
forms should solve problems by creating a system of checks
and balances on both processes.... The key is to give deci-
sion makers the incentives to manage resources properly.53
That is absolutely correct. The trouble is that Anderson and
Leal, having succeeded in teaching us all of this, go on to ig-
nore the same lessons themselves. In the balance of their dis-
cussion, which is to say, in most of their book, they beg the
problem of coordination and forgo any effort at serious com-
parative analysis. The excellent and unbiased account in their
first two chapters is followed by eight more chapters that are,
by and large, partial, superficial, and unilluminating. In the be-
ginning the reader is dazzled, but by the end the authors seem
to have been blinded, probably by their own prejudices.
For example, a theme running throughout the vignettes of
Chapters 3-11 is that the government rather routinely goes
astray in its efforts to manage the environment-whether be-
cause the government has insufficient information, processes
what information it has with little discipline, seeks to advance
bureaucratic welfare more than environmental quality, buckles
under to well-organized interest groups of one or another
stripe, or simply wastes resources because it does not bear the
coStS. 5 4 But even if these accusations are justified, they do not
by themselves adequately advance the argument to use markets
in place of government regulation. Quite to the contrary, the
long list of complaints about the government cuts in the oppo-
site direction, for the simple reason that markets themselves
depend on an active governmental role, as Anderson and Leal
recognize.55 Why will the government not fail in setting up and
52. Id. at 6-7, quoting from Randal O'Toole, Learning the Lessons of the 1980s, FOREST
WATcH, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 6.
53. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 6-7.
54. See, e.g., id. at 23 (political solutions become entrenched and inhibit the forma-
tion of markets), 58-59 (institutional failure brought on by self-interested bureaucrats
influenced by lobbying groups), 62 (government mismanages its land resources), 71
(same), 115 ("whims ofjudges and administrators" have made property rights uncer-
tain), 125 (government's policy on fisheries has resulted in waste).
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Recognition of the government's nec-
essary role in a market regime runs throughout Anderson and Leal's discussion,
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overseeing the new natural resource markets, just as it fails,
and for the same reasons, in setting up and overseeing regula-
tory programs?
The question is absolutely crucial, yet Anderson and Leal
give it hardly a nod, and what little they do say is not very
promising for free market environmentalism. The case studies
sketched in the last eight chapters of their book contain as
much testimony about how the government has inhibited the
formation of markets as about how it has promoted them.5 6
Though the courts are praised for their record in helping to
define and enforce property rights,57 they are also criticized for
defeating private ownership through such means as the public
trust doctrine.5" Anderson and Leal end up in a bind. Their
case for markets turns considerably on their case against the
government; at the same time, their broadside against the gov-
ernment undermines their argument for markets.
That great utilitarian Jeremy Bentham alluded to this prob-
lem over a hundred years ago, except he used the word "law"
where I use the cognate "government." "Property and law are
born together," he wrote in his Theory of Legislation, "and die
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take
away laws, and property ceases." 59 For Bentham, the "legisla-
tor owes the greatest respect" to the security of expectations
upon which property is based; "when he disturbs it, he always
produces a proportionate sum of evil." 60 Why won't markets in
environmental resources be tainted by the very evils of govern-
ment about which Anderson and Leal complain?
It is possible, of course, that the harmful incentives thought
though sometimes the point is only implicit. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at
22, 118, 131-32, 166.
56. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 71-72, 115, 124-25, 128-29. But see id.
at 29-31 (suggesting that the government did the right thing). Given Anderson and
Leal's account of the incentives of government actors, we would expect government
resistance to the formation of markets-at least in instances where the market is offered
as a sweeping alternative to regulation. Government actors comprise an important and
powerful interest group that benefits from regulatory regimes and is thus inclined to
keep them in place. So it is far from clear why the government would ever be interested
in, or tolerate, radical moves to markets of the sort envisioned by Anderson and Leal.
More likely they would oppose such moves tooth and nail, or insist upon concessions
that would corrupt the market mechanism.
57. Id. at 32-33.
58. See id. at 112-114.
59. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (London, Trilbner, 4th ed.
1882).
60. Id.
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to distort government intervention are less forceful in the case
of government-as-market-maker than in the case of govern-
ment-as-regulator, but, if so, the theory underlying that possi-
bility is hardly obvious. The question seems to be an empirical
one, and the facts indicate a mixed picture. The wayward path
traced in Anderson and Leal's vignettes points in no clear di-
rection; the dependence on government is acknowledged but
not pursued, even though resolution of the issues to which de-
pendence gives rise is crucial to the argument for environmen-
tal markets. All in all, the impression is that the issues never
even occurred to Anderson and Leal. That impression is fur-
thered by other evidence as well. At the conference leading up
to this symposium, a young economist in the audience put a
question to Anderson after he presented the argument for free
market environmentalism. Under which general sorts of condi-
tions, the economist wondered, might the market approach be
expected to succeed, and under which might it be expected to
fail? Anderson pondered for a moment and then replied,
"That's a good question." He said he had not thought about
it.61
As Anderson and Leal explained in their introductory chap-
ters, there are any number of reasons to worry that the govern-
ment will distort markets in natural resources just as much as
existing regulatory programs distort use of those resources
now. Consider, as a rather all-inclusive example, that the natu-
ral resource property rights envisioned by Anderson and Leal
would be worth many billions of dollars; the initial question of
rights allocation would thus be hotly contested.62 After all,
under our existing regulatory regime industrial polluters are
entitled to pollute for free up to the limit allowed by applicable
regulations. With a rights system, polluters would either have
to control all their pollution or buy rights to emit what they did
not want to control-unless they owned the rights from the
outset, as a result of the initial distribution.
61. Terry L. Anderson, Remarks at Conference on Free Market Environmentalism,
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College (April 13, 1991).
62. To get an idea of the enormous wealth that would be available for distribution in
nationwide markets in natural resources, consider that the estimated 1982 value of
merely 150 tons per day of sulfur oxide rights, and merely in California's South Coast
Air Basin (the Los Angeles area), was between $60 million and $225 million! See GLEN
R. CASS ET AL., CALIFORNIA INST. OF TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY LABORA-
TORY REPORT No. 22-I, IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE PERMITS FOR SULFUR OXIDES EMIS-
SIONS: A CASE STUDY IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN 22-23 (1982).
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Given the billions of dollars involved, polluters are going to
fight mightily for a large original endowment that will be deter-
mined by the government.63 Conservationists are going to
fight, too, of course, and even the general public will be inter-
ested in having rights to a clean environment rather than al-
lowing polluters to own rights to pollute. Each interest group
will try to deal with the government, which is itself composed
of self-interested actors. Which groups are likely to have a com-
parative advantage-the various polluter groups or conserva-
tionists and environmentalists and the general public? ' Why
would there not be all the problems of free riders, holdouts,
transaction costs, externalities, and governmental malincen-
tives that Anderson and Leal see as such a plague on the pres-
ent regulatory system? Indeed, might not these problems be
greater because the stakes are greater?
Yet Anderson and Leal do not give any systematic attention
whatsoever to the distribution issue and the hornet's nest of
problems it contains. They seem to believe there is some natu-
ral order that determines the matter-that, for example, I am
obviously .entitled to clean air rights over my land, so an indi-
vidual pollutes my air at the peril of strict liability unless that
individual buys my rights from me. If that is the case, we will all
spend the rest of our lives transacting and litigating. If that is
not the case, what is?6 15
63. Battles over rights distributions are starting already with respect to proposals for
tradable permit systems in greenhouse gases and fishing rights. Regarding greenhouse
gases, see Trading Places, EcoNOMIST,July 7, 1990, at 33 (discussing "the appalling diffi-
culties" of distributing greenhouse gas permits between "third-world" and "indus-
trial" countries---'Third-world countries and the Soviet Union would agree only if they
were sure they would have spare permits to sell; America, which would be the main
buyer of permits, would agree only if it knew in advance what price its industry would
have to pay other countries for emission permits."). Regarding fishing rights, see Peter
Passell, U.S. Starts to Allot Fishing Rights in Coastal Waters to Boat Owners, N.Y. TIMES, April
22, 1991, at Al, All (discussing the federal government's program "to turn over to
private interests the exclusive rights to the multibillion dollar harvest of fish off the
United States coast," and noting the "deep division over who should financially benefit
from the distribution of the rights," the market value of which is estimated to be "at
least $10 billion.").
64. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. A range of issues regarding the
politics of distribution in the context of incentive-based environmental regulations is
discussed in Hahn & Stavins, supra note 7.
65. Anderson and Leal discuss the expectation "that individual dischargers will
lobby to increase or decrease the number of permits" under any tradeable permit sys-
tem in which the rights are initially distributed by the government. ANDERSON & LEAL,
supra note 1, at 147. They go on to imply that their free market alternative would avoid
this problem because it "would require polluters and recipients of the discharge to
bargain over the level of pollution. Bargaining may take place in the form of an ex-
change of property rights, where the discharger pays the recipient for disposal before
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Even if the problem of distribution is put aside, Anderson
and Leal still exhibit a blind faith that everything else will just
work out, simply because it has, at times, in the past. Thus, they
cite instances where "good" interest groups have triumphed,
public goods problems have been overcome, the government
has managed to do the right thing, and free-rider problems and
transaction cost problems have been surmounted.6 6 But, as I
have said, they also cite instances to the contrary.67 What they
don't tell us is why the constructive instances happened, or how
to avoid the counterproductive ones.
Anderson and Leal give no attention to dynamics or mecha-
nisms, to the magic keys that open the way to fruitful coordina-
tion. Instead, they engage in what Carol Rose has called
"narrative.- 68 They tell stories of failure and stories of success,
and the successes themselves are never explained but only de-
picted. We can get hope from them, but little else. Anderson
and Leal do not provide even a clue about how the dysfunc-
tional features of common property's tragic structure have on
occasion been transcended, yet that is precisely what we need
to know before embarking on the grand reform called free mar-
ket environmentalism. By what means did this interest group or
that manage to organize in the face of seemingly insurmounta-
ble collective action problems? Why has the government at
times been unbiased in establishing markets? What are the con-
ditions that determine failure and success?
There is only the suggestion, terribly familiar to the litera-
ture on property rights theory, that the necessary things just
"happen." In particular, Anderson and Leal sound a provoca-
tive theme, running throughout the book, that "environmental
entrepreneurs" and "institutional entrepreneurs" will find it
worthwhile, as environmental resources become more scarce
and thus more valuable, to devote energy and ingenuity to the
the fact or in the form of payments for damages paid after the fact." Id. This begs the
question. How were the "property rights" distributed in the first place? The question
does not simply answer itself. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
66. For just a partial list, see id. at 28 (cattlemen effectively organized into effective
interest group), 29-31 (government did the right thing), 70 (land conservation efforts
show that private markets can provide public goods), 108 (free-rider problems over-
come), 110 (innovative contractual arrangements can overcome public goods
problems), 118 (coalitions can organize to bring about needed institutional reforms).
67. Again, for just a partial list, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; AN-
DERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 17, 58-59, 126 (concern with counterproductive influ-
ence of special interest groups), 14-15, 95 (free-rider problems).
68. Rose, supra note 44, at 48-53.
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successful development of free market institutions.69 If it is that
Panglossian, who needs a book?
IV. CONCLUSION
So much for my lament about Free Market Environmentalism.
Let me conclude by suggesting a partial list of topics that would
be truly valuable in a book on the subject:
(1) A study of ways and means detailing precisely how and
why successes and failures were achieved in the management of
environmental resources, rather than further stories. In partic-
ular, the research program should aim to explain how non-gov-
ernmental groups and institutions have at times overcome
collective action problems as they sought the production of col-
lective, or public, goods like environmental quality. There is a
literature here, but it needs systematic enlargement. 70
(2) Close and disinterested attention to the shortcomings of
markets, especially in the environmental context. The upsurge
of environmental legislation that began in 1969-70 provoked
an equally energetic and sizable outpouring of critical studies
on regulatory performance, and these in turn led to articles and
books like Anderson and Leal's in praise of the market alterna-
tive. Lacking are many new insights into market failure.7 '
(3) Sustained inquiries into the appropriate domain of mar-
kets, matters of efficiency aside. Surely, for example, there is
value in free public access to some natural resources; there is
also evidence that extra-legal norms can develop to control re-
sources in such settings.72 A market in national parks might
function effectively in allocational terms, yet not be the best al-
ternative precisely because it closes lands that should be left
open. Similarly, the array of distributional issues entailed in es-
tablishing markets, ignored by Anderson and Leal, should be
explored. How are rights to be defined and apportioned? How
should rent-seeking be controlled? How may regressivity be
avoided? Beyond this, the alleged dangers of "commodifica-
tion"-treating every possible good like it is a thing to be
69. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 1, at 21, 34, 108, 150.
70. See, e.g., RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982);JAMEs E. KRIER & EDMUND
URSIN, POLLUrION AND POLICY 263-77 (1977).
71. See, e.g., STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? (1981).
72. See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
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traded-should be confronted.73 To put the point more gener-
ally, as my colleague Rick Pildes has, we have to be mindful of
the "unintended cultural consequences" that might follow
from wholesale substitution of a market regime for a regulatory
one.
74
(4) Further inquiries into command-and-control regulation.
Anderson and Leal are correct in suggesting careful compara-
tive institutional analyses. These could lead to entirely new in-
sights, including new forms of institutions that have yet to be
imagined.
Perhaps most important of all, we need less hubris on the
part of reformers of any persuasion. In this respect, Anderson
and Leal fall grievously short. To be sure, the government's
environmental record to date is sufficiently sorry to make out a
clear case for modest, careful, closely studied experiments in
reform. But Free Market Environmentalism urges us to revolution.
Its importuning is remarkably premature, weakly supported,
and probably counterproductive, in that it is more likely to
close minds than to open them. The book rests too little on
analysis and too much on ideology, all the while pretending the
opposite. It is a proselytistic work. In its understandable efforts
to dispense with familiar, ill-reasoned, pro-regulation baggage,
it proceeds to gather up a similar collection of pro-market bag-
gage, most of it heavy with question-begging. Fighting fire with
fire, it sheds more heat than light.
73. See KELMAN, supra note 71, at 54-83.
74. Richard Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on
the Symposium, 89 MicH. L. REV. 936 (1991). "Unintended cultural consequences"
means, essentially, the unanticipated "effects of public policy on social understandings,
norms, and meanings." Id. at 938.
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